Introduction
The term "gazelles" has recently become common in the entrepreneurship literature to describe firms that enjoy rapid growth (e.g., Acs/Mueller 2008; Parker et al. 2010 ; Hen rekson/Johansson 2010). However, just as the term suggests, most of these firms reach the limits of growth after a short period of time (Parker et al. 2010) . Despite the promi nent attention such firms have received from scholars, management practitioners and policymakers over the years, many questions about the nature of their growth and the possibility of sustaining it remain unanswered (Stam 2010) .
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Continuously growing firms are those that manage to repeatedly discover, develop and explore new opportunities, and are also able to overcome phases of temporary decline.
They constantly expand their range of activities and gain a robust standing in their market environment, which allows them to grow further. However, the exact factors that distin guish continuously growing firms from others are only partially understood. This paper sheds light on some of the open aspects of firm growth, which has been an important agenda of Ulrich Witt (1998 Witt ( , 2000 Witt ( , 2007 . We look at large firms that have successfully grown over longer time periods and describe their growth paths in order to develop a more fine-grained understanding of continuous growth.
Scholarship on organizations has flourished over the past 50 years but, to our knowledge, no handbook summarizing key descriptive statistics on the development of organizations has been assembled. Such descriptive data would enable scholars of organizations to refine their theories because they would be able to more readily ascertain whether large and small organizations operate according to similar or different principles. Such descrip tive statistics would also be valuable to managers in determining how quickly and how large they can grow their organizations without jeopardizing viability and performance. It would also be of immense value to identify the maximum growth capability of firms in order to develop appropriate public policy for governmental agencies. If an individual firm's growth is limited, rapid economic growth can only be achieved if multiple firms exist in a sector. Given that we presently lack descriptive data that address the important question of how quickly an organization can grow, we have studied the growth pattern of seven firms that realized continuous growth over long time periods and became very large: Cisco, General Motors (GM), IBM, Microsoft, Sears, Starbucks, and US Steel. The seven firms in our sample were chosen to represent diverse industries.
In other branches of sciences, collecting descriptive data on the objects of study is an important preparatory task for developing good theory. Anthropologists and medical scientists, for example, began by collecting descriptive data that define human charac teristics before developing theories about the species. Detailed information on average growth rates, the sizes of the tallest and smallest individuals who have lived into adult hood, etc., are very important data that can be used to identify abnormal growth of a particular human being and potentially recommend hormonal treatment. To understand the proper functioning of key organs, it is important to obtain information that relates organ size to the overall size of a human body.
Researchers have found that humans grow at different rates in different phases of life. In general, the velocity of growth decreases from birth onward (and actually from as early as the fourth month of fetal life), but this decrease is interrupted shortly before the end of the growth period. From birth until age four or five, the rate of growth in height declines rapidly, and then the deceleration gradually becomes less. Then there is a marked acceleration of growth between age 13 and 15 years called the adolescent growth spurt.
In principle the growth rates and development patterns of firms can be studied in the same way anthropologists and medical researchers study the growth and development patterns of human bodies. Some theoretical research has been done on the growth patterns of individual firms and general patterns of firm growth in organizational populations (e.g., Langlois/Robertson 1995; Witt 1998 Witt , 2000 Witt , 2007 Cordes et al. 2008; Cordes et al. 2010; Baaij et al. 2011) . But to the best of our knowledge, no one has conducted a systematic empirical study to collect descriptive data of firms that have experienced successful growth over many years and decades.
Even the literature on gazelles has mostly focused on identifying factors that determine fast growth rather than on examining patterns of firm growth. Putting the insights about growth factors in the recent gazelle literature into the larger context of the lifecycle approach (Tushman/Romanelli 1985) and developmental theory of the firm (Witt 2000) may enable scholars to better determine in what phase of a firm's development fast growth is likely to occur. Collecting descriptive data about organizational growth is a crucial first step toward such an integration and further theory development.
Unlike human growth, where we know that growth in no other development period is likely to be faster than the adolescent growth spurt, organizational researchers have yet to explore systematically whether firms have identifiable periods of growth and maximum growth rates. Scholars have hypothesized that firm growth rates are affected by several factors, including firm size, firm age, human capital, organizational efficiency and pure chance, but they have not collected systematic information on the average and maximum growth rates of firms. This paper takes a step in this direction through a study of minimum, average and max imum growth rates among the seven companies in the sample. Having identified peaks and troughs in their growth rates, this paper further examines whether the changes in the growth rates show characteristic patterns. The results of this analysis allow us to develop a better understanding of the growth phenomenon. Our approach of studying very large firms in particular may provide insights on the highest growth rates possible beyond the first few years of a company's life, and therefore expose the range of the upper boundaries of firm growth. The descriptive data presented in this paper may serve as a starting point for developing a theory of firm growth and formulating hypotheses about the development patterns of growing firms. Our paper thus contributes to ongo ing efforts to develop theory of firm development inspired by evolutionary economics (cf. Witt 1998 Witt , 1999 Witt , 2007 .
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review previous theoretical and empirical research on firm growth rates, which leads to the conclusion that we lack knowledge about max imum growth rates and growth patterns of established firms (i.e., companies that are at least a few years old). To fill this gap in the existing literature, we then present historical quantitative data that we collected on fast-growing firms that became very large. The actual growth rates of the seven companies in our sample provide an estimation of the rate of growth across industries, age, organizational design, and other factors. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for theory building, future research, and man agement practice. The descriptive data are not only important for determining scale and scope conditions of organization theories, but also very useful for managers. They offer yardsticks that make it possible to determine bottlenecks (stagnant growth) and oppor tunities (increased growth) for individual firms. Furthermore, the data are beneficial to public policymakers because they provide one important reference criterion for deciding whether to support a specific company or facilitate the creation of multiple firms.
2 Analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature:
factors influencing firm growth rates There is a large number of publications about the various factors that influence the growth of organizations (cf. Sutton 1997; Caves 1998) . We have analyzed this literature to learn about how quickly firms can grow. Research on firm growth spans many industries and countries and in recent years the number of articles on firm growth has grown substan tially (Coad 2009 ).
In addition to reviewing a broad literature spanning the past few decades, we examined very closely a sample of 162 articles written in the past three years on firm growth. We searched the term "firm growth" in the ABI/INFORM database fields for title, abstract and subject heading. This yielded 255 articles. Upon closer examination, 162 articles were deemed to be true contributions to the literature on firm growth. Based on this review we found that firm size, firm age, human capital and organizational efficiency had been identified as determinants of firm growth rates. 123 articles explored human capital as a factor of firm growth, followed by 23 articles on firm size, ten on firm age and six on organizational efficiency. See Table 1 for a summary of the factors of firm growth by number of articles. The factors are discussed in detail below.
Past research has pointed out that growth prediction is extremely difficult and that chance plays a significant role in determining a firm's fate (Goronzy et al. 1974) . Davidsson (1991) concluded from empirical investigations that indeed a large number of factors affect firm growth. More recently, however, scholars have accounted for more diversity in firm growth research, examining a variety of determinants that would predict firm growth. The upsurge in firm growth research reflects an epistemological shift in presum ing that firm growth may in fact be predictable. In other words -and in contrast to earlier entrepreneurship research -scholars now believe that firm growth may actually be anticipated, which eliminates chance as an explanation. Thus, the number of published articles in the past three years that point to pure chance as the predictor of firm growth has become zero. Gibrat's (1931) argument, conventional wisdom held for several decades expected firm growth rates are independent of firm size. This idea subsequently was c "Gibrat's Law". In the past, many articles dealt directly with "Gibrat's Law", and substantial number of them limited their research to small firms (Acs/Audretsch Chakrabarti 1990; Acar 1993; Hay/Kamshad 1994; Merz et al. 1994; Storey 1 Chittenden et al. 1996; Greening et al. 1996; Bryson et al. 1997; Barringer/Green 1998) . Other articles focused solely on large firms (Geroski et al. 2000; Kania/Mc (Eriksson 1984; Fulton et al. 1995; Greenwald et al. 1990) ; the overwhelming majority of articles either qualifed or disconfirmed it. Wagner (1992 Wagner ( ,1994 found that neither a lognormal relation nor any other systematic relationship existed between firm size and growth. In contrast, most empirical work concluded an inverse relation between firm growth and firm size, such that firm growth decreases as size increases (Kumar 1985; Evans 1987a Evans , 1987b Cabrai 1995 Cabrai , 2003 Das 1995) . Dunne and Hughes (1994) determined that after firms reach a certain threshold of size, Gibrat's Law proves true; that is, Gibrat's Law holds only for larger firms. Other scholars noted that growth occurs faster for smaller companies (Mata 1994; Orser et al. 2000) .
The majority of papers in the past three years confirm these findings and refute Gibrat's Law. In fact, only six of the 23 articles from our sample agreed that growth rates were independent of firm size ( 
Firm age
One might conjecture that, as is true of human development, a firm's growth slows as it ages. Jovanovic (1982) first proposed this inverse growth-age relationship in his theory of firm learning (Storey 1994a) . The overwhelming majority of the articles about firm-age relations support his idea. Evans (1987a , 1987b ), McPherson (1996 , Pelham and Wilson (1996) , and Stevenson and Jarrillo-Mossi (1986) all concluded that as companies age, their rate of growth decreases, contributing to a stabilization of industry concentration (Davies/Geroski 1997) . Some research, however, indicates that in an infant industry, age positively impacted growth in young firms (Das 1995) . If this is the case, it seems that age only becomes negatively related to firm growth in a more mature phase of an indus try. Nevertheless, growing firms generally tend to be younger companies, while firms in decline are comparatively older (Orser et al. 2000; Klepper/Graddy 1990) . Acar (1993) is the only scholar who found that firm age was not a significant factor explaining size or performance.
All articles that explored the relationship between firm growth and firm age dur ing the past three years found that Jovanovic's rule applied ( . In other words, the pattern of younger firms growing quickly but then more slowly as they age is consistently found in recent empirical literature.
Human capital
Most research on firm growth has focused on how human capital affects firm develop ment. Human capital consists of such properties of individuals as personal skills, capabil ities, experience and knowledge. One of the most influential contributions on the relation between human capital and firm growth is Penrose's (1959) theory of the growth of the firm. Penrose (1959) proposed that firm growth is limited by an organization's bounded human capital, and therefore managerial resources have to grow at a rate somewhat faster than that of the size of the firm (Gander 1991) . The growth of managerial resources and capabilities is often seen as a necessary condition for a firm to grow because the avail ability of managerial resources directs the growth through knowledge acquisition and application (Foss 1998) .
Some scholars reacted to Penrose's theory and argued that there are organizational forms that maximize firm growth without requiring as many associated managerial resources.
Besides franchising (Shane 1996a (Shane , 1996b Thompson 1994) , inter-organizational rela tionships with other firms (Peng 1997 ) and cooperative relationships with external orga nizations termed as "satellites" and "constellations" (Lorenzoni/Ornati 1988) have been studied.
Nonetheless, Penrose's (1959) theory has historically been supported (Kangasharju 2000; Orser et al. 2000; Storey 1994a Storey , 1994b .2 Factors limiting management appear to con fine firm growth. For example, Davidsson's (1991) study shows that differences in man agers' ability and perception of the need and opportunity for growth explain a substantial share of the variation in actual and historical growth rates. Top management's risk-taking propensity and willingness to gamble with a firm's success bound firm growth to manage ment's human capital (Covin/Slevin 1998) . Information costs also represent a limitation on firm growth (Prescott/Visscher 1980) because dispersed information exacerbates man agement's limited attention span and increases the difficulty of controlling firms (Gifford 1992 ).
Building on Penrose (1959) , several studies recognized the general importance of managers and their leadership strategies for bringing a firm into growth (Daily/Dalton 1992; Eidson 1993; Kania/McKean 1981; Cornelius 1979; Fergus 1995; Datta/Guthrie 1994; Merz et al. 1994; Penrose 1959 ). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) showed that the size, past experience and heterogeneity of the founding top management teams affect firm growth.
Some scholars noted that management could decide to use mergers as a way to attain firm growth, improve company performance and increase organizational profitability (Ikeda/Doi 1983; Rose 1992) . Another key to growth besides mergers was manage ment's ability to forge constructive networks, create external relationships, develop use ful alliances, navigate government reforms, identify sources of external funding, disclose financial records, achieve vertical integration, and accomplish geographical expansion (Woodward/Dingle 1988; Zhao/Aram 1995; Lane 1995; Demirguc-Kunt/Maksimovic 1998; Shamis/Lewandowski 1996; Levy et al. 1984; Barringer/Greening 1998; Green ing et al. 1996) . On the other hand, multinational strategies had an inverse effect on growth (Siddharthan/Lall 1982) , while cash flow and leverage had indeterminate effects on long-term growth (Hayashi/Inoue 1991; Lang et al. 1996) .
Some scholars found that management of human resources, e.g., raising company morale, aligning organizational goals and making decisions about outsourcing, is an important 2 Evidence supporting Penrose's theory came from various articles (Prescott/Visscher 1980; Acs/ Audretsch 1990; Davidsson 1991; Gander 1991; Gifford 1992; Storey 1994a Storey , 1994b Covin/Slevin 1998; Kangasharju 2000; Orser et al. 2000) . The only author whose findings contained a limitation to Penrose's findings was Gander. Gander (1991) found that Penrose's theory holds true for firms he studied within 1977 to 1980, but that firm size and managerial resources grew at commensurate rates for firms from 1983 to 1986. factor in firm growth (Klaas et al. 2000; Sickles 1999; Baer 1987) . Managers who made critical strategic choices relating to technological change and knowledge management could affect firm growth (Iwai 1984; Starr 1988; Kotha/Nair 1995; Hitt et al. 2000) . Unionization is a factor that affected firm growth in an unpredictable way. Acs and Audretsch (1990) found that as unionization increases, small firm growth decreases. In contrast, Bronars and Deere (1993) found no evidence of a significant influence of union ization on firm growth.
Other scholars argued that managerial motives, including increased company profits, greater individual compensation, and even improved neighborhood conditions could explain firm growth (Acar 1993; Goronzy et al. 1974; Cubbin/Hall 1983) . Scholars also explored management motivation in entrepreneurial companies and concluded that neither task nor hierarchical motivation had any significant effect on growth (Bir ley/Westhead 1994), while another author (Miner et al. 1989; Miner 2000) stated that task motivation of entrepreneurs had a slight effect on growth. One study found that individual managerial characteristics, including gender, played a significant role in firm growth in developing countries (McPherson 1996) .
Similar to earlier research, the factor garnering the most scholarly attention by far in the past three years of firm growth research has been human capital. Following in the footsteps of Penrose, 76% of the articles in our sample focused on how managers mat ter in affecting firm growth. 2.4 Organizational efficiency and the business environment Dunne and Hughes (1994) found that industry concentration did not matter in the long run as much as efficiency. In contrast, Hay and Kamshad (1994) show that intensity of competition limits firm growth, especially during recessionary periods. However, their analysis is based on management's subjectively perceived intensity of competition, which is different from objectively measured competition. Hay and Kamshad (1994) also find another central factor hindering firm growth, which is the often prevalent problem of management having to deal with increased administrative burdens arising from expan sion. Arrighetti (1994) found evidence that efficiency is not as important in firm survival and growth as are individual firm entry modes and growth patterns.
Within the past three years, factors that would have been attributed to organizational efficiency, including individual firm entry, industry concentration and firm competitive ness, have shifted the focus from organizations as a whole to specific individuals such as managers choosing when to enter a market and how to react to changing marke shares. Furthermore, organizational efficiency has been analyzed in the context of sp cific legal and policy constraints (e.g., inflation), which affect the market structure a business environments in which firm growth occurs ( 
Taking stock
This analysis of a large number of studies on firm growth revealed that scholars hav investigated extensively a large number of factors that in principal can influence fir growth. Yet the literature provides no data on the simple empirical question: What a the minimum, average and maximum rates of growth that historically successful firm have experienced? This question is important for a number of reasons. Managers ne to know how fast they can grow their firms under the best circumstances, and publ policymakers need to know if they can rely on a single firm to provide products a services in a market that can grow at very high rates. In the following sections we purpo to answer this simple but important empirical question.
Methodology
For this study, we selected Cisco, General Motors, IBM, Microsoft, Sears, Starbucks and US Steel because of their historical significance as leading and enduring Americ companies. Where available, data begin at the year of the initial public offering (IPO) of each com pany. In some cases such as IBM and Sears, sales and employee data were only availa substantially later than the IPO. For General Motors, we were able to collect data on sales and employees from some years before the IPO.
We should emphasize here that, in their first years of existence, companies starting from a small number of employees may experience growth rates that never appear again a that are substantially larger than the ones that we report here for long-lived firms. F example, two people founded Google in 1997. The third employee was added in 1998 1901 1903 1903 1903 In 1999, the number of employees increased to 40, which is an effective growth rate of 1230%. Such a rate was never achieved again, and Google's median employee growth rate is just a bit higher than Cisco's, which we report here in detail.
Empirical analyses and results
Growth may be defined in terms of absolute size increase from one year to the next or in terms of percent change between years. This paper focuses on the second indicator, which is the traditional measure of sales growth and employee growth. In the following sections, we present the fastest, slowest and average rates for both sales growth and employee growth, along with standard deviations. Table 3 shows the degree of autocorrelation of sales and employee numbers for each company by presenting autocorrelation coefficients in each firm's time series of sales and employee growth. Table 4 summarizes the sales growth data and Table 5 the employee growth data. Figures 1 and 3 depict the sales and employee growth data, respectively, in box plot. Of the companies we surveyed, the lowest minimum rate of employee growth was General
Motors at -34.90% in 1921, followed by US Steel at -28.47% in 1921. IBM and Sears had comparable minimum employee growth rates of -15.03% in 1993 and -11.04% in 1995, respectively. In contrast, Starbucks and Microsoft maintained positive minimum employee growth rates of 4.00% in 1998 and 5.73% in 1994, respectively. Cisco's slowest employee growth rate was a stunning 25.26% in 1997.
Our data show that the average employee growth rate decreases with the age of the com pany. At the same time, the standard deviation tends to decrease with age as well. Cisco -as the youngest firm in the sample -led in average employee growth rates with 65.57% with the largest standard deviation of 29.09%. Microsoft and Starbucks, the two other young firms in the sample, also had high average employee growth rates and large stan dard deviations. Starbucks attained a strong average employee growth rate of 49.21% with a standard deviation of 28.59%. Microsoft had an average employee growth rate of 29.00% with a standard deviation of 17.38%, which was less than half Cisco's rate. The four remaining companies, founded between 1886 and 1911, had lower but still substantial average employee growth rates combined with lower standard deviations.4 Dropping precipitously from the aforementioned rates, IBM had an average employee growth rate of 5.95% with a standard deviation of 14.91%. Similarly, General Motors had an average rate of 5.78% with a standard deviation employee growth rate of 1.77% with the lowest stand pany had a negative average employee growth rate, n standard deviation of 11.14%. Averaging the average em seven companies results in a growth rate of 22.39% wi of 18.45%.
The specific employee rates for Cisco, General Motors, IBM, Microsoft, Sears, Starbucks, and US Steel are depicted in Figure 4 .
5 Discussion
Sales growth
Cisco, Starbucks, and Microsoft maintained relatively high and consiste growth rates for multiple years. In contrast, IBM, General Motors, Sea experienced periodically negative and more widely fluctuating sales gro the companies in our sample attained maximum sales growth rates abov hovering around 75%. No company achieved its maximum sales growt the latter part of its history. Except for General Motors, all companies slowest sales growth rates in years subsequent to their maximum sales g is still true for GM in recent years because the large drop in s was not as large in percentage terms as in 1931-1932.) However sales growth rates was very wide, between 6% and 88%. The four substantially lower average sales growth rates than the other th the total average sales growth rate of 32.62% across all firms.
Employee growth
Five companies in our sample -Cisco, General Motors, IBM, Starb displayed high maximum employee growth rates of 57% and high panies represented the youngest companies in the sample. Cisco l fastest employee growth rate. All companies experienced their slo rate after attaining their maximum employee growth rate, usu one another (IBM and Sears took 30 and 40 years, respectively). growth rates, the younger firms Cisco, Starbucks, and Microsoft average employee growth rates at 65.57%, 49.21% and 29%, resp hand, General Motors, Sears, and US Steel consistently displayed employee growth rates, and experienced a wider range of fluctu
Some emerging patterns
The younger generation of companies (Microsoft, Starbucks, and fastest sales growth rates within a few years of their IPOs, poss resources through the IPOs. In contrast, the four older compan Motors, Sears, and IBM) experienced their maximum sales grow through their existence, which points to a cresting effect. In addition, though the four older-generation companies in our sample were operating during the Great Depression in the 1930s, none of them experienced their minimum employee growth rates during that period. In contrast, the older companies Sears and IBM both experienced their minimum sales and employee growth rates in the 1990s, the same decade that contained the slowest sales growth rates of the younger companies, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Cisco. It is worth noting that even Microsoft and Cisco, which provide software and infrastructure for the Internet era and belong to the younger group of firms in the sample, could not maintain their previous high level of growth rates.
About half the companies in our sample attained maximum sales and employee growth One striking pattern that emerges from the comparison of the seven companies in our sample is that in all cases the average sales growth exceeds the average employee growth. This means all firms in our sample realized a continued increase of employment efficiency. We can infer from this finding that they not only managed to increase permanently their production and sales capabilities, which is a crucial basis for their sustained growth, but they were also able to coordinate the expansions of their workforces. The seven firms appear to have continuously implemented the required organizational adaptations to suit a growing number of employees. In other words, they tend to have superior capabilities in the organization of their workforces to better leverage available human resources.
Inflation could be another explanation for average sales growth rates exceeding average employee growth rates.5 Even if it only partly explains the higher average sales growth rates, it counteracts the above argument. Thus, an inflation-based effect weakens the conclusion that the seven firms were permanently increasing their employment efficiency and therefore having substantially superior capabilities to manage employee growth. In fact, constantly growing firms may have such superior capabilities, but to a lesser extent than expected without considering inflation.
This paper contributes to one important research stream in Ulrich Witt's broad agenda on an evolutionary approach to economics (Witt 2003) , in which the theory of the firm plays
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this very valuable comment. a prominent role (Witt 1998 (Witt , 2000 . Witt highlighted the central role that entrepreneurs and their ability to coordinate firm activities play in an economic theory of the firm (1999). He pioneered the idea that a cognitive dimension is crucial to understanding organizational development (1998). This was a departure from the conventional view of organizational economics, which has focused on transaction costs and optimal sizes rather than the developmental process underlying organizational growth (Rathe/Witt 2001) . Entrepreneurs must not only develop a vision of how to run a profitable firm, they also have to convey that conception to the members of their firm (Witt 2007) . Conveying the vision of the business is a coordinative task that becomes increasingly difficult as a firm grows. An entrepreneur may address this challenge in various ways, thus presenting a variety of developmental paths (Witt 2000) , such as restructuring an entrepreneurial firm and implementing managerial layers to enable firm growth. Other options include selling the firm or muddling through, either of which results in becoming a niche player or exiting the market.
This paper provides some indirect evidence supporting Witt's evolutionary approach to the theory of the firm. Our results show that coordinating constant organizational growth is required to solve the coordination problem of managing a workforce in such a way that the output per staff member is increasing on an ongoing basis, while the number of employees itself is permanently growing. The seven firms tended to mitigate emerg ing frictions by carrying out adequate structural adjustments. It would be an important topic for further research to look more closely into the relation between firm growth and organizational restructuring, and what role the inspiration of the entrepreneurs and the executive management teams plays.
6 Conclusions and future research Cisco, General Motors, IBM, Microsoft, Sears, Starbucks, and US Steel represented a wide selection of US-based companies from which we extracted sales and employee data to draw general trends about firm growth. Based on Cisco's figures, we draw the pre liminary conclusion for companies that have existed for a few years that 162% is the maximum sales growth rate in any one year that a company can grow without merg ers and acquisitions, while a rate of employee growth around 115% appears to be the maximum annual employee growth rate even including some mergers and acquisitions. On average the highest sales growth achieved by our sample of seven firms was about 96.57%, and the average highest employee growth was 67.44%. To be more certain that these numbers are accurate estimates of the maximum firm growth rates, it would be valuable to study other fast-growing firms. Since we chose well-known, large firms, we can already say with confidence that the maximum growth rates of firms are clearly limited. We observed one company achieving 162% once. The important conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that any established firm trying to grow by more than 200% per year is unlikely to achieve its goal. Managers need to know that there are clear limits to growth of firms.
On the other end of the spectrum, General Motors showed that a company experiencing a negative sales growth rate as high as -46.55% (-34.90% in terms of employees) can still survive and remain an important player in the economy. However, this tends only to be the case if such a decline is a rare event and not sustained for multiple years. In fact, the age and size of a firm may play an important role in helping a firm to survive a substantial decline.
This study is not without limitations. One is that the sales and employee growth rates of the firms in our sample are observed from the date of their IPO (in two cases even substantially later; in one case a few years earlier). We see this as a major limitation of the study because this means that our findings are applicable primarily to large firms that have already reached a certain size. Our insights may be less relevant to small teams and entrepreneurial new ventures.
Furthermore, high growth rates may be the result of acquisitions but also of delayed growth after some years of low growth rates, e.g., due to a recession. On the other hand, one can argue that even if high growth rates are due to acquisitions and delayed expan sions, continuously growing firms are distinct from less successful firms as they are capable of managing these phases of accelerated growth.
Future research is needed to analyze the times when these limits were reached in the context of the broader history of the company and general economy -for example, fastest growth occurred within ten years of founding and slowest growth occurred within the last recession -and then determine whether a general trend for attaining these limits exists. In the future we plan to examine in more detail the conditions under which the fastest growth rates in the history of individual companies were achieved. A study of the history of individual companies from a Penrosian point of view would shed light on the importance of growth of human capital, i.e., the management's ability to assess growth opportunities and overcome bottlenecks through capability building, networking and mergers. It would also enable researchers to study in more detail the limiting effect of a firm's human resources on growth, as Penrose (1959) had argued. Furthermore, a longitudinal data set for a large number of firms from a variety of industries, sizes, classes, maturity levels, and national origins needs to be put together to obtain more accurate overall growth and employee growth rates. This would provide more accurate estimates as to how fast a firm can grow even under the best circumstances, and provide managers as well as policymakers with clear yardsticks of what is feasible. It will also provide an empirical demarcation of the speeds of firm growth, which could someday be explained by a new theory of firm growth.
